A two-level security game theory model for optimal resource allocation considering deception

Dehghan, Hamed; Shamami, Nader

doi:10.22034/jmor.2024.717822

A two-level security game theory model for optimal resource allocation considering deception

Document Type : Original Article

Authors

Hamed Dehghan ¹

Nader Shamami ²

¹ Tarbiat modares university

² AJA Command & Staff University

10.22034/jmor.2024.717822

Abstract

Security is one of the basic needs in every society, which will have a fundamental impact on different parts of it. Also, security threats and terrorism require that limited security resources be deployed in an optimal state. Game theory is a common approach used to understand the motivations, strategies, and allocation of limited security resources of attackers and defenders. In this paper, a security game between a defender and several attackers is investigated considering uncertainty and in a situation where the defender and the attacker try to deceive each other. Therefore, the defender's utility, which consists of maximum security and minimum cost, as well as the attacker's utility along with their limitations, are modeled. Then, the solved model and their application in defense decision-making are explained. Fuzzy theory is also used to solve the problem of uncertainty. The obtained results show that by using the model, limited security resources are optimally allocated, which helps to improve security conditions and deal with security threats.

Keywords

Stackelberg security game

Optimal allocation

Fuzzy theory

Deceptive resources